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Abstract
Features such as face, fingerprint, and iris imprints have been used for authentication in
biometric system. The toughest feature amongst these is the face. Extracting a region with
the most potential face features from an image for biometric identification followed by
illumination enhancement is a commonly used method. However, the region of interest
extraction followed by illumination enhancement is sensitive to image face feature
displacement, skewed image, and bad illumination. This research presents a cancellable
face image algorithm built upon the speeded-up robust features method to extract and
select features. A speeded-up robust feature approach is utilised for the image’s features
extraction, while Winner-Takes-All hashing is utilised for match-seeking. Finally, the
features vectors are projected by utilising a random form of binary orthogonal matrice.
Experiments were conducted on Yale and ORL datasets which provide grayscale images
of sizes 168 × 192 and 112 × 92 pixels, respectively. The execution of the proposed
algorithm was measured against several algorithms using equal error rate metric. It is
found that the proposed algorithm produced an acceptable performance which indicates
that this algorithm can be used in biometric security applications.
Keywords Feature selection. Speeded-up robust feature.Winner-takes-all. Hash function. Can-
cellable biometric
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1 Introduction
Biometrics is an individual authentication and identification method that utilises many organs.
The identification stage implements the verification and validation of users in a dataset while
the authentication stage implements acceptance of users [6].
Biometric systems were proposed to mitigate the many challenges that were found in
traditional authentication systems. Though many of the problems were solved or mitigated by
biometric systems, there remain two major issues of security theft and privacy invasion in
current biometric systems. These two problems hinder achieving optimality in biometric
systems’ development. This happens due to the magnitude of the security violation involved
in biometric identity breach because individual biometric data cannot be changed [10].
Due to the promising nature of biometric authentication systems, substantial adoption has
been witnessed in comparison to basic authentication techniques like username-password and
token-based methods which are found in different domains of application. However, two key
challenges in biometric-based authentication systems exist - security and privacy inversion.
Breach of either of the two mentioned challenges can lead to two permanent loss of personal
identity due to the permanency and intrinsic nature of the data involved. This leads to research
the question of “How compromised biometric data can be replaced without sacrificing the
accuracy of the system?”. This necessitates the need to provide a robust biometric system that
can withstand, protect, and in case of successful compromise, be capable of creating a different
unique biometric template regardless of application type and domain, through a well-designed
protection mechanism to disable chances of cross-matching. This mechanism should contain
four established design criteria to meet the required protection capability as suggested in [1,
10]. These criteria are Irreversibility, Revocability, Unlinkability (Diversity) and Degradation.
Only two criteria were suggested in [12, 13] to meet the required protection capability. These
criteria are Irreversibility and Unlinkability.
Irreversibility simply means the ability of the system to make it extremely difficult, if not
impossible, to regenerate the initially captured biometric data regardless of the computing
power. In the case of revocability, one needs to understand that biometric data has to undergo
some encryption before being stored. Thus, in the case of it being stolen, the system’s ability to
generate an entirely different encrypted template from the original to prevent cross-matching in
another application is known as revocability. Diversity refers to the ability of the system,
during regeneration of other templates from the original template, to generate a template that is
different from any others that were previously generated, as in the case of system compromise
or for utilisation in other systems to ensure maximum privacy protection. Degradation, in this
context, implies that the recognition accuracy of the system should be preserved regardless of
the time stretch [1, 10].
Two major approaches can be found in the researches in securing a biometric pattern. The
first approach is a biometric cryptosystem which can be further sub-categorised into two
schemes, i.e., create a key and bind-key structure [4]. The second approach is a feature
transformation approach which is often referred to as the cancellable biometric. This approach
can also be partitioned into non-invertible transformation and biometric salting [1, 4, 10]. In
biometric salting, a unique, distorted biometric template is produced by merging the user’s
biometric data, a secret key and an input factor which is independent of the first two inputs.
This method can be likened to password salting that can be found in cryptography [10, 25].
Bio-hashing is a well-known method used to achieve reliable biometric salting. Bio-hashing
employs the method of mixing the initial biometric data with a token before converting it into a
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discrete binary format to produce a uniformly random sequence of a hashed key. For the non-
invertible transformation situation, the initial biometric data is encrypted in such a way that it
cannot be reconstructed before it is being stored in a database. The approach is meant to
provide maximum protection and privacy to the original biometric data [10]. This is achieved
by passing the biometric data through a one-way function. The function uses, as part of its
parameter, an externally generated specific range of values that serve as a secret key, obtained
from the user, to generate the main template that has been saved in the database. This makes it
easy for any generated template to be revoked if compromised. It allows another different and
distinctive template to be generated from the initial template by changing the obtained secret
key [25].
The biometric cryptosystem (or helper data method) is based on acquiring biometric
information which, though not concealed, does not in any way reveal the actual biometric
template. The method determines the validity of either generated or retrieved keys through a
comparison based on the procedure adopted for generating the helper data. The key generation
scheme generates the required encryption keys directly from the person’s biometric informa-
tion. The key binding method’s main aim is to provide mapping between encryption keys and
the person’s biometric information so that it will be impossible to regenerate the encryption
keys without having access to the original template at the time of authentication. It is worth
mentioning that there is observed performance degradation in the key binding method when
compared with the key generation method due to the effect of error correction in the key
binding method. However, the basic goal of the two methods is to supply a secured biometric-
based encryption key [10].
It is of great importance to point out the major distinction between creating the key method
and bind-key method. Key binding and key creation operate differently on how the helper data
are being extracted. In the key generation method, all helper data come from the original
biometric pattern before the key is created from the combination of the biometric character-
istics obtained from the query and the helper information. In the case of the key binding
method, the initial biometric pattern is interfaced by a cryptographic key through mapping.
The combination of both the cryptographic key and biometric data is stored as the helper
information, for which an access key can only be issued if a similarity to a certain threshold has
been reached [20].
In this paper, the two-dimensional Winner-Takes-All (WTA) [4] hashing will be used to
develop a cancellable transformation algorithm called Speeded-up Robust Features-Winner-
Takes-All (SURF-WTA). The proposed algorithm is based on Random Binary Orthogonal
Matrices Projection [4] to protect speech biometric information. Investigation on different
biometric traits such as fingerprint and face has been suggested in [4]. This was part of the
motivation of this work to investigate on face biometric modalities. Moreover, this study has
also been motivated since there are many challenges in the present face image template
security as reported in [4]. Some of these challenges are [4]:
i Most of the image pattern protection methods have been reported to be vulnerable to
various malicious attacks such as stolen token, and attacks through record multiplicity
because of the strong relationships amongst the patterns created through utilising the same
biometric feature. Therefore, the opponent can obtain the original template by analysing
many compromised templates.
ii The biometric feature is also transformed from one location to another which results in the
loss of distinct features while increasing the intra-class variation. The accuracy of matching
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will be negatively affected. Thus, it is crucial to create templates that are not dependent on
each other but fulfilling the unlinkability and revocability criteria.
In contrast to the work in [4], the proposed SURF-WTA algorithm combines four methods
which are SURF, random binary orthogonal matrices, permutated feature, and WTA non-
invertible transformation. These methods have not been previously combined, especially in the
subject of cancellable face biometric pattern. The combination of the four methods to form an
algorithm is considered as the key contribution of this study. These methods are employed to
form the proposed SURF-WTA algorithm because:
i. SURF is an excellent feature selection method and it is utilised within the proposed
algorithm to produce a more robust and faster feature extraction/selection process.
ii. The feature extraction and selection activities using the SURF method are permutated to
produce robustness of the proposed algorithm.
iii. The permutated features are projected with random generated binary orthogonal matrix to
enhance the strength of the proposed algorithm.
iv. Prime factorisation is used to improve the security and privacy.
The organisation of this paper is as follows: The related work on cancellable biometrics and
biometrics cryptosystems in security is explained in Section 2. Section 3 describes the methods
and materials that have been used in the proposed SURF-WTA algorithm. Experiments and
results are discussed in Section 4 while Section 5 presents the conclusion and future work.
2 Related work
This section will focus on the image template protection schema. A cancellable biometric is a
method focused on distorting and varying of obtained biometric features to produce various
forms of biometric patterns. A cancellable template simply means a template generated from a
transformation, through an encryption function of the original biometric data to prevent access
by malicious intruders. The transformation or encryption process must ensure that the trans-
formed data possess the ability of not being recovered. The transformed template generated is
often referred to as a cancellable biometric template, as described in [10]. There are four basic
criteria that a cancellable template must possess:
i. It must not be revocable in a situation where the generated template is compromised.
ii. Diversity in terms of generating transformed templates from the original.
iii. It must be able to preserve the integrity of the original biometric data after transformation
for accuracy recognition, and
iv. The original data must not be reversed or regenerated from any compromised template.
Cancellable biometrics has been studied by [10, 15, 19, 23, 25, 26, 29, 33, 35, 40, 42, 44]. The
first use of cancellable biometrics was proposed by the authors of [40]. The authors studied
several non-invertible transformations like functional transformation, polar, and Cartesian in
the construction of characteristics of a fingerprint pattern. The fundamental minutiae charac-
teristics are employed in the fingerprint pattern. Original minutiae features are not stored.
Minutiae orientations and locations that are kept are converted irreversibly. The authors
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concluded that a cancellable transformation in a feature domain can be an alternative approach
to produce acceptable performance. Besides [40], the authors in [19] propose a method to
facilitate the implementation of a Fuzzy Commitment Scheme (FCS). The major obstacle
against the implementation of the proposed method was the difficulty of FCS to efficiently
capture the minutiae in its most detailed format. Hence, the authors employed the effective
binarisation method which emphasises on capturing the most discriminatory features of the
captured fingerprint using Gabor filters, local binary pattern and local direction pattern. A
method meant to serve as a template in creating an alignment-free cancellable fingerprint
pattern was put forward by Wang, Yang, and Hu [44]. The proposed method built local
minutia via zoning pairs of minutia. Panchal and Samanta [35] employed a support vector
machine ranking mechanism, a statistical-based technique, to extract biomedical features to
generate a hashed code by using the Reed-Solomon encoding technique. The hashed code is
then used to generate a secret key for biometric authentication.
The Gabor filtering technique was also utilised in [10] as a novel cancellable iris template
generation approach to generate invariant feature vectors. The method in [10] was able to
regenerate a different pattern built on the initial pattern kept in the database. This cancellable
iris pattern generation approach was based on a randomised look-up table with the ability to
shield the original captured biometric information, in case the hashed template gets stolen.
Harkeerat and Pritee in [23] proposed a new cancellable biometric pattern creation approach
utilising Gaussian arbitrary vectors and a one- path modulus hashing. As an alternative to
utilising the initial pattern, the suggested approach utilises converted pattern forms for keeping
and matching. The main goal of this work was to generate a cancellable biometric pattern that
is non-invertible and produce an improved function. Cancellability is obtained through a
projection of biometric pattern on an arbitrary array. This array has columns that are generally
distributed (Gaussian) vectors where the values of mean and variance are recorded. Another
work for Harkeerat and Pritee was proposed in [26] where a smart card built on biometric
authentication structure utilising cancellable fake biometrics identities is used. They also
developed a confidential sharing system to focus on protection and privacy concerns in a
distant multi-server nature appropriate for either cloud or network where many applications are
put on many servers. Cross-matching and any additional database attacks can be avoided
through creation of many fake identities from the initial user biometric. Thus, this will enable
the user to work securely on different applications. The authors used an arbitrary distance
approach to create revocable, different and non-invertible fake identities. This creation is done
by reducing pattern size to 50% of its original size. So as to create sharing, confidential sharing
ideas are used over transformed identities and user-specific keys. These sharings are kept on
distributed databases. Multiple servers can be accessed through the smart card that transmits
only several sharings. The authors of [15] proposed a new effective approach to accomplish
privacy sustaining face recognition in the cloud. Diffusion, permutation, and shift transforma-
tion methods are combined to create a new transformation. This new transformation is utilised
to secure the privacy of faces. The projection and recognition techniques are implemented in
the encoded field with no interaction. The authors also proposed an optimisation approach to
maximise the productivity of encoding.
Random slop has been proposed as a new cancellable biometric approach in [25]. This
approach creates protect revocable, and non-invertible patterns. In this approach, the biometric
characteristics, and some arbitrary individual-specific information are mapped as dots on the
Cartesian plane. The slopes, and the intersection of lines across the arbitrary dots are computed
to create transformed characteristics. RS-V1 and RS-V2 approaches have been suggested
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within the proposed idea to create a reduction in dimensionality and to fulfil the necessary
cancellability principles. A lightweight face recognition system that depends on depthwise
separable convolution has been proposed in [29]. The triplet loss approach is utilised to
optimise the training light face model. The light face needs a huge quantity of training data
and parameters and this will keep the information of an individual, which can be recovered by
attackers. Thus, to solve this issue, the authors proposed a lightweight face recognition system
called ‘LightFace’ that can be used for robust privacy security. In the proposed system, the
information generated from biometric data and noise data is integrated with the initial
biometric data to make it more secure. This will enhance the confidence in using the system.
The ensemble learning is also used to maximise the arbitrariness of the initial information
distribution and improve the strength of the system.
A novel face biometric system which depends on optical transformation has been proposed
for protection and authentication [42]. To make the suggested system non-invertible, the face
biometric is transmuted by utilising the stage retrieval method. Optimum biometric character-
istics are selected by a sparse cover and linked with the chaotic technique which is kept for
purpose of verification. The chaotic variables are joined like a pin variable to the registered
individual in the enrolment stage. The proposed system is useful to improve the protect
technique through the use of a two-variable authentication approach. The authors in [33] have
proposed a novel face encoding system built on fuzzy commitment, chaos characteristic
permutation, and binarisation transformation approach. To improve discriminability, actual
valued patterns are encoded to their binary forms through novel special binarisation transfor-
mation count on the output correcting code. The chaos characteristic permutation is then
utilised to maximise the protection as well as privacy of binary patterns in securing the fuzzy
dedication approach versus cross-matching attacks.
Cryptosystem biometric has also been studied apart from cancellable biometric [2, 30, 32].
Mai, Lim and Yuen [30] proposed a binary feature fusion technique based not only on its
discrimination ability, but also overall system security. The authors considered the degree of
variation that can be found between binarised extracted features which can be differentiated
based on the dependency of sources. Each distinct feature is extracted forming a group of
features from a unimodal source. The extracted features of each group are fused through
mapping. The mapping process minimises the variations of intra-user and increases the
variations of inter-user. A framework that has the capability of integrating many biometric
cryptosystems with a high degree of reliable security to the template model has been proposed
by Murakami, Ohki, and Takahashi [32]. This framework was built on the concept of a
minimum number of extracted input characteristics. The proposed method performs its
computational process at feature level by sequencing and fusion of the on-the-spot extracted
features each time a user tries to access the system; it determines the authenticity of the input
value based on the stored hashed template. Barman, Chattopadhyay, Samanta and Panchal [2]
proposed a technique based on a key regeneration FCS that ensures secured communication of
encrypted data between users and efficient preservation of biometric data privacy. A two-stage
protocol operation is necessary to produce the technique. In the first stage, a locker-to-locker
exchange of the extracted key is performed using the secured information kept in the database.
The second protocol is to create a key process of FCS and use it to exchange the secret key
from the locker through the recipient-based personalised locker.
Accuracy, security and privacy are major shortcomings of cancellable biometrics and key
binding approaches. So, Jin, Goi, and Tay [20] proposed a scheme that bridges existing
cancellable biometrics and biometric cryptosystems. The achieved biometric template is
Multimedia Tools and Applications
protected by creating a cancellable transformation from randomised graphic-based hamming
embedding. Their method proved to be effective for template protection. A multi-biometric
protection method, proposed by Gomez-Barrero, Maiorana, Galbally, Campisi, and Fierrez
[13], is based on bloom filter and designed in such a way that both biometric and multi-
biometric templates are protected from malicious attacks. The authors have tested their
proposed method on different multi-sources of biometric data ranging from iris, facial and
fingerprints of individuals.
3 Methods and materials
This section is meant to provide the methods and materials of the proposed SURF-WTA
algorithm. Descriptions on the SURF and WTA hash functions which provide- the foundation
of the work are provided. This is followed by the details of the proposed SURF-WTA
algorithm.
3.1 Speeded-up robust features
One of the commonly utilised methods to identify significant features is the Feature Selection
(FS) method [16]. Nevertheless, identifying these significant features in huge dimensional data
is usually a difficult task [28]. So, FS method is a necessary step and it is utilised to minimise
dimensionality, unrelated data, and data redundancy [9, 38]. FS is a procedure to minimise the
number of characteristics. Moreover, FS includes a select subset of features from the initial
features set. The core aim of FS is to minimise data dimensionality and to improve perfor-
mance [38]. Investigating strong, adaptable, and effective FS methods to manage the growth of
big data is yet an exciting issue. Lately, investigating effective FS methods to manage big data
with high-dimensional challenges as well as to enhance the execution of the algorithms has
been one of the necessary research areas in the different application fields [9]. Chi-squared,
mutual information, a random forest of decision trees, SURF, etc. are all methods for FS [41].
The Speeded-Up Robust Feature is a novel descriptor and detector method that has proved
to be excellent in detecting points of interest in a given region. The method is scale, rotation
and illumination invariant [48]. It is considered as a faster feature extraction and selection
method than other methods. SURF utilises a descriptor built on specific characteristics, the
difficulties of which are reduced when compared with other methods [14]. SURF is derived
from the scale-invariant feature transform [18]. The SURF method uses two distinctive
processing steps. In the first stage, the detector assigns a base orientation to a given key point
with an identified circular boundary. Then, in the second stage, the circular region is projected
onto a squared region from which the descriptor of SURF is extracted based on Haar wavelet
reactions. Improvements recorded on SURF were based on utilising the Hessian detector. The
improvements were noticed on the accommodation of various lighting changes, different
image compression, and intensity of image blurring and image rotation. SURF gives an output
of 64-dimensional data [22]. This enables SURF to be used in various domains ranging from
computer vision in object recognition and image reconstruction which is usually in three
dimensions [11, 21].
Speed and simultaneous processing are the key characteristics of SURF which has the
functions of recurrence, uniqueness, scale and rotation invariance, and robustness [17, 34, 39,
49]. Generally, SURF contains four stages: keypoint detection or interest point detection, an
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optional step of orientation assignment, local descriptor, and keypoint matching (utilising its
descriptor) [31, 37]. There are many reasons to use the SURF method. SURF which has been
established on the theory of multi-scale space also has a valuable implementation in obtaining
distinct characteristics from the images. It will not change upon orientation, scaling, as well as
being partially invariant to affine distortion or different brightness. SURF is also significantly
faster than Laplacian of Gaussian kernel because it utilises the Fast-Hessian detector. Finally,
the SURF detector can detect tiny objects and points of interest of isotropic possessions [48].
3.2 Winner-takes-all hash
Winner-Takes-All hash is an advanced method used by Google due to its effectiveness in
enabling fast similarity searches. The method can be used to generate different sequences
based on the number of permutations. It utilises the rank of association measures and records
the position of the highest value of biometric features. This happens after the application of
random permutations [4]. Every hash function of WTA describes an embedding of digits and a
related rank that measures the similarity of correlation. An invariance rank will be offered
related to disorder in numeric rates and is suited, perfectly, as a foundation for sensitive
hashing of the locality. The WTA hash functions are decisive, non-linear and yield insufficient
descriptors. WTA hash has also yielded significant improvement using simple linear classifiers
which take a shorter time to train. The WTA hash that contains any data will permit the
coefficient to be restructured in the hashed vector, even though it is a partial organisation [8].
The algorithm for obtaining the position vector for the WTA hash is explained with an
example as shown in Table 1. Assume there are four features with five items each. The
first step is to input several sets of feature x. Randomly change the position of the item in
each set and permute x’. Assume the first four items are selected from each x’. Determine
the maximum value amongst the four selected items. Then, determine the position (index)
of this maximum value. The hashed code is placed to be equivalent to the position of these
maximum values [45].
4 Proposed SURF-WTA algorithm
The SURF-WTA algorithm has been proposed to protect the face template in this research.
Features were extracted and selected from the face image using SURF and then permutated to
obtain a robust non-invertible characteristic. This will make it difficult for an attacker to access
the original template and retrieve the original feature value. WTA hashing has been utilised
after the permutation process. This hash function is also used in the Google image retrieval
domain to prepare the hash code matrix. Due to the non-linearity properties of hash functions,
it is expected for them to be non-invertible. Furthermore, a hashed datum is not expected to be
Table 1 WTA example
Feature x 10, 5, 6, 12, 3 4, 5, 10, 2, 3, 1 22, 12, 6, 14, 26, 8 11, 4, 3, 7, 13, 2
Permuted feature x’ 5, 3, 10, 6, 12 10, 5, 3, 1, 4, 2 12, 8, 6, 26, 22, 14 4, 13, 3, 2, 11, 7
Select first four items 5, 3, 10, 6 10, 5, 3, 1 12, 8, 6, 26 4, 13, 3, 2
Identify position of highest item 2 0 3 1
Hashed code 2, 0, 3, 1
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regenerated to its original form after being hashed unless considerable computing time has
been spent. The resultant hashed code should be able to withstand invertibility attack on a
template. This needs the hash function to be conflict-resistant. Thus, it is extremely difficult to
obtain information that will create the exact hash value. Conflict resistance is achieved in
portion, through creating extremely big hash values. The proposed algorithm will take in the
image set and will output the Equal Error Rate (EER). Amongst the calculation that will be
performed are the Permuted Feature (PF), hash code, similarity score, False Rejection Rate
(FRR) and False Acceptance Rate (FAR). The pseudo algorithm is shown as follows:
Pseudo algorithm of the proposed SURF-WTA 




y = no. of images in image set
For x = 1 to y
Read image (x)
Extract image feature using SURF 
Select the strongest extracted feature
Permute the strongest selected feature
For i = 1 to no. of the hash function
Create orthogonal matrices
Project the permuted strongest selected feature with orthogonal matrix
Select first members
Find position of highest no. amongst the first selected members
Calculate PF
Compute prime factorisation for PF
Hash code (i) = total count of prime numbers
Compute similarity score 
Compute FAR, FRR, and EER
Figure 1 shows a one-round graphical implementation of the proposed algorithm. For every
image, the SURF algorithm will extract important characteristics and multiply them by the first
Fig. 1 A one-round implementation of the SURF-WTA algorithm
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generated binary orthogonal matrix. Several of the first generated feature members are then
selected. For example, only the first three members are selected. The position of the maximum
number (PMN) is identified and a random number is generated to calculate the PF. The
calculation of PF is done using Eq. 1 [4]:
PF ¼ PMNþ 2ð Þ  random number ð1Þ
Thus, if a generated random positive number is 40, the permutated feature will be 160. The
prime factorisation of 160 is then computed. In other words, 160 will be represented as
multiplication of prime numbers. The benefit of using such a random positive number is to
strengthen the robustness of the proposed algorithm and enable the template to remain intact.
Finally, the total count of prime numbers (which is 6) is assigned as the first digit of the hashed
code. The second and consecutive digits of the hashed code will be obtained from the second
and consecutive rounds of implementation of the SURF-WTA algorithm.
The SURF-WTA algorithm is simple and less complex compared with other algorithms
such as the region of interest or Hill cypher algorithms. The main limitation of the Hill cypher
method is that it encrypts the same plaintext blocks to the same encrypted plaintext block.
Thus, image features that reveal patterns in the plaintext can be obtained. Furthermore, it can
be simply destroyed with an acknowledged plaintext attack that exposes vulnerable protection
through solving a system of linear formulas to discover the decoding matrix. The region of
interest extracting method followed by illumination enhancement is sensitive to image feature
displacement, skewed image, and bad illumination. So, detecting the skew angle of the image,
correcting the skewed image based on a skewed angle, and enhanced illumination must first be
implemented before using the region of interest algorithm. This will lead to an increase in
computational complexity as a result of matrix multiplication operations. In the proposed
algorithm, there is no need to hide image features as required in the Hill cypher. Furthermore,
the proposed algorithm is not affected by image displacement, skewed image, and bad
illumination as in the region of interest method.
5 Experimental result
Experiments were performed on two datasets to assess the SURF-WTA algorithm. Compar-
isons were made with Principle Component Analysis (PCA), Linear Discriminant Analysis
(LDA) [23], optical transformation, digital holographic built on cancellable biometric for
personal authentication, also cancellable face verification using optical encryption and authen-
tication [42], Hill cypher [24], Random Permutation Maxout (RPM) [7], Deep Convolution
Neural Network (Deep CNN) [36], and Hybrid Gabor Principle Component Analysis
(HGPCA) [27]. An EER metric, which is considered the standard measurement utilised to
measure the execution of the cancellable biometric algorithm, is used. EER computes the
probability of false acceptance and false rejection. A smaller EER value means good perfor-
mance [24]. Results of the experiments are presented and discussed based on seven (7) items:
i) face datasets, ii) similarity score, iii) FAR and FRR, iv) effect on EER with different window
sizes, v) effect on EER with different hash functions, vi) performance comparison with other
algorithms and vii) revocability criteria of cancellable biometric.
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5.1 Face dataset
The datasets utilised in the experiments are the Olivetti Research Laboratory (ORL) face
dataset and Extended Yale face dataset. The ORL is a publicly available face dataset that
includes groups of faces acquired from April 1992 to April 1994 at the ORL in Cambridge,
United Kingdom. This dataset contains 400 images of 40 persons taken against a dark
background at various times of the day, and slightly varied lighting settings and facial gestures.
The images were acquired while the owners were facing front (though tolerance of slight side
movement was given) and all are in the upright position. Also, all images were greyed to a
value of 256 levels per pixel at a size of 112 × 92 pixels for each; it includes 40 persons’ face
images with ten images each per person [3]. In conducting the experiments, the first image of
each user was employed as the base pattern while the remaining nine images of the exact user
were considered as the query images employed to compute the FRR. The FAR was also
computed using the same method as FRR. In that manner, 1800 genuine matching tests and
78,000 imposter matching tests were obtained based on the above rule.
Similarly, the extended Yale face dataset B used in the experiment has the same data format
as the previous Yale face dataset. The extended dataset includes images of 38 individuals
(unlike the first Yale face dataset with only ten individuals) is made up of 1128 different
images which were taken under nine different poses and 64 various illumination conditions.
The images used in the experiment were pre-processed by converting each image into 168 ×
192 pixels size and were all properly aligned and cropped [46]. In computing the FRR, the first
image of each user was employed as the base pattern while the balance of 63 images were
considered as the input query. As for the computation of FAR, the first image of each user was
selected as the base pattern and the remaining images were treated as input queries. Based on
the described rule, the yielded result showed 76,608 genuine match tests and 2,879,488 for the
imposter matching tests.
5.2 Similarity score
To ensure the protection of the initial biometric information, the matching function in the
SURF-WTA algorithm was conducted in a transformed domain. The two phases of enrolment
and verification were included in the algorithm. The features of the target image were
extracted, and only significant features were then selected by using the SURF method. The
selected features were converted into vectors of integers which were then projected with
orthogonal matrices based upon non-invertible transformation and continued with the other
steps of the SURF-WTA algorithm, as included in Algorithm 2. The result of transformation
was then hashed and stored in a database from which comparison and verification were
performed at later stages. At the verification stage, the database was queried based on a hashed
query that was transformed with an exact procedure employed during the transformation of the
original biometric data to the hashed feature vector as described above. The similarity value
was then computed to determine the existing matching, or otherwise, amongst the two
characteristic vectors. The similarity score is calculated using Eq. 2 [4]:
Similarity score ¼ number of zeros
length of hashed code
ð2Þ
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The procedure to calculate the similarity score is as follows:
i. Determine the difference between stored hashed code denoted as Sx and hashed code used
as query denoted as Sx, (i.e. Sx - SxÞ.
ii. The number of zeros “0” in the resultant vectors are determined. Existence of zero “0”
indicates that there is a match between the enrolled hashed code and the hashed code in
the query.
iii. Determine the value of similarity score by computing the total count of zeros “0” over the
total length of the hashed codes.
Table 2 illustrates an example of a matching value calculation.
The similarity score calculated using Eq. 1 is within 0 to 1. A small score indicates less
similarity amongst vectors of the pattern and query [47].
5.3 Computation of FAR, FRR, and EER
A genuine attempt can be described as a single attempt by the user to match the user preserved
pattern/template. The imposter attempt is when the individual’s pattern/template matched
another individual’s template. Many genuine and impostor attempts are made in the system
and all similarity scores are saved if the system’s performance were to be measured. Both FAR
Table 2 Computation of similarity score
Step 1 Enrolled hashed code, Sx 6 10 1 4 7
Query hashed code, Sx 5 10 2 4 7
Compute the difference between enrolled hashed code (Sx)
and query hashed code (Sx)
Sx - Sx
1 0 −1 0 0
Step 2 Compute number of 0’s in Sx - Sx
no. of 0’s = 3
Step 3 Compute the similarity score between enrolled hashed code (Sx) and query hashed code (Sx) using Eq. 2
Similarity score = 0.6
Table 3 Effect of window size
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and FRR are used in computing EER as performance metrics and values which can be
calculated using Eqs. 3 and 4 [5]:
FAR ¼ number of impostors that have been authenticated
number of impostor users
ð3Þ
FRR ¼ number of users that have been correctly authenticated
number of genuine users
ð4Þ
The EER is utilised to assess the execution of the SURF-WTA algorithm. EER is the
functioning situation where FAR and FRR are equivalent. Calculation of EER was performed
using Eq. 5 [43]:
EER ¼ FARþ FRRð Þ=2 ð5Þ
5.4 Effect of window size
Optimum window size has been investigated based on EER. The window size varies from 5,
10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 35, 40, 45, and 50. From Table 3 and Fig. 2, when the window size is











Fig. 2 Effect of window size
Table 4 Effect of the hash function
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window size is small, there will be a chance to obtain fewer zeros and this will result in a low
similarity score. Increasing the window size enables EER to capture more “0 s” which then
enables the probability of capturing other values in the window to be reduced.
Conclusively, more bits are considered as the window size increases which, in turn,
compensates for the effect of similarity score subtraction. However, the result shows that
when a certain window size is reached, a decrease of EER level-off occurs which means there
is a need for a much bigger window size to gain the lowest EER.
5.5 Effect of the hash function
The relationship between hash function values and verification performance is examined in
this section. Different experiments were executed based on various hash function values of 10,
20, 30, 40, 50, 100, 200, 300, and 400 as illustrated in Table 4 and Fig. 3. Experimental
outputs show an increment of better similarity score with an increase of hash function value
subject to different window sizes. However, with a lowered hash function, there is a noticeable
deterioration of the algorithm’s verification performance which, in turn, results in EER
increment.
5.6 Performance comparison
From previous studies on the facial-based template protection domain, the number of samples
used for verification of different methods and techniques differ amongst researchers. However,
in this study, the first image of each user is considered as a base pattern and the balance of the
images were considered as the query used to determine the FRR. In computing FAR, each first
image of every individual is placed as the base-template while all remaining images from the
remaining users are set as the query. The comparison of SURF-WTA performance on ORL
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Fig. 3 Effect of the hash function





Hill cypher [41] 7.12
RPM [42] 6.75
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SURF-WTA, [23, 24, 27, 36, 42] on the extended Yale dataset. PCA and LDA were used in
[23]. The method used in [24] is a one-way hashing on the biometric template by making use
of the non-invertibility of the Hill cypher algorithm while the method used in [7] is a
cancellable algorithm that is based on RPM transform. [36] uses deep CNN. Two scenarios
have been used in [36]. In scenario 1, the exact result of the deep CNN, i.e., with no hashing
has been used while in scenario 2, the deep CNN result has been mapped and hashed to get
high protection. Both scenarios used 128, 256, 512, 1024 bits of security. Their best results
from these two scenarios were with 1024 bits of security as shown in Table 6. Finally, the
method proposed in [27] utilised the HGPCA method to extract features. Then, the extracted
features are transformed using wavelet transform and concatenated. Finally, scrambling is
performed to the concatenated features utilising the arbitrary key given amongst the user.
It can be noted that the SURF-WTA algorithm is capable of preserving the verification
performance with an insignificant deviation of EER = 1.17% and 4.99% for Yale and ORL
face datasets, respectively.
5.7 Revocability
Revocability is regarded as one of the key elements required for a cancellable biometric system to be
considered as an effective qualified system. The importance of revocability in a cancellable
biometric system is to enable the system to have any compromised template to be rendered useless,
while another new template for a user should be auto-generatedwithoutmaking the newly generated
template share any similarities with the revoked template, hence enhancing security.
The Yale dataset was used in this experiment for testing the revocability effect of the
proposed SURF-WTA algorithm. A hash code was generated and matched with different hash
codes generated from binarised random matrices with orthogonality properties. In total, 200
hashed codes are obtained from the proposed algorithm amongst 200 various binary orthog-
onal arrays. Various hashed codes are compared with the first to calculate the total of pseudo-
imposters. To generate an aggregation of 199 × 2 × 38 = 15,124,1 the procedure is reiterated for
various face images users. A window size of 50 and round hash function of 200, as illustrated
in Fig. 4, was utilised to aggregate the scores of the imposter spread, along with the scores of
pseudo-imposters. It is possible to notice that the distribution of the imposter scores is similar
to the distribution of pseudo-imposter scores. This ensures that although the recently produced
1 Only 200 hashed codes were generated for the first two images of each user





Digital holographic [17] 1.77
Optical encryption [17] 1.36
Optical transformation [17] 1.19
Hill cypher [41] 9.95
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hash codes originated from an identical characteristic of the face image, they are still
unrecognisable to each other. As the old hashed code is unrelated to those recently produced,
it can be justified that the presented algorithm achieved the criteria of revocability.
6 Conclusion
A cancellable face image template protection called SURF-WTA has been proposed for
biometric recognition system. Comprehensive experimental results have shown that the
proposed algorithm is capable of meeting the required conditions for a biometric algorithm.
The proposed algorithm has also fulfilled the revocability and cancellability criteria of
biometric algorithms. The experimental results show that when the number of hash functions
and the window sizes increase, the EER values decrease and this indicates that the SURF-
WTA algorithm is better than other compared algorithm. To test the revocability criteria of the
proposed algorithm, experiments on the Yale dataset have shown that the proposed algorithm
accomplished the revocability criteria. Furthermore, users are not required to keep track of any
random symbol or binarised orthogonal matrix. The proposed algorithm has the advantage of a
fast similarity searching mechanism fromWTA and it also possesses the ability to exhibit both
the strengths of non-invertible properties coupled with non-invertible functions in addition to
the randomised user-specific generated token. However, there are several limitations to the
proposed SURF-WTA algorithm. It cannot be applied to real-time face image dataset and the
algorithm consists of complex mathematical formulation.
Cancellable biometrics is a promising area of research. Further research can focus on
designing new feature extraction algorithms. Cancellable biometric systems also need to be
designed based on non-invertible efficient functions which utilise other feature extracting
methods with the use of deep learning method.
Fig. 4 Pseudo-imposter and imposter distribution on Yale dataset
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